Software veri cation encompasses a wide range of techniques and activities that are geared towards demonstrating that software is reliable. Veri cation techniques such as testing provide a way to assess the likelihood that software will fail during use. This paper introduces a di erent type of veri cation that shows how likely it is that an incorrect program will not fail. Our veri cation applies fault-injection methods to predict where actual faults are more likely to hide. This veri cation can be combined with software testing to assess a con dence that the code is not hiding faults.
Introduction
Software veri cation is often the last defense against disasters caused by faulty software development. When lives and fortunes depend on software, software quality and its veri cation demand increased attention. As computer software begins to replace human decision makers, a fundamental concern is whether a machine will be able to perform the tasks with the same level of precision as a skilled person. If not, a catastrophe may be caused by an automated system that is less reliable than a manual system. Therefore we must have a means of assessing that critical automated systems are acceptably safe and reliable. In this paper, we concentrate on a veri cation technique for assessing reliability.
The IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology (1990) de nes software veri cation to be the \process of evaluating a system or component to determine whether the products of a given development phase satisfy the conditions imposed at the start of that phase."
Restated, software veri cation is the process that assesses the degree of \acceptability" of the software, where acceptability is judged according to the speci cation. Software veri cation is broadly divided into two classes: dynamic software testing and formal veri cation (which typically involves some level of static theorem proving). Dynamic software testing is the process of executing the software repeatedly until a con dence is gained that either (1) the software is correct and has no more defects, which is commonly referred to as probable correctness 3], or (2) the software has a high enough level of acceptability. Testing can alternatively be subdivided into two main classes: white-box and black-box. White-box testing bases its selection of test cases on the code itself; black-box testing bases its selection on some description of the legal input domain.
Static theorem proving is the mathematical process of showing that the function computed by a program matches the function that is speci ed. No program executions occur in this process, and the end result is a binary value: either the function computed by the program matches the speci cation or it does not. Problems arise in this rigorous process, because of questions concerning program termination and the correctness of the rigorous process itself (Who will prove the proof?). Furthermore, the process of completing such a proof can be more di cult than writing the program itself.
In this paper we describe a di erent type of veri cation that can complement both dynamic testing and static theorem proving. This new type of veri cation, which we will call \software testability," focuses on the probability that a fault in a program will be revealed by testing. We de ne software testability as the probability that a piece of software will fail on its next execution during testing (with a particular assumed input distribution) if the software includes a fault.
Veri cation, by the standard IEEE de nition, is a way of assessing whether the input/output pairs are correct. Testability examines a di erent behavioral characteristic: the likelihood that the code can fail if something in the code is incorrect. Computer science researchers have spent years developing software reliability models to answer the question: \what is the probability that this code will fail?" Our testability asks a di erent question: \what is the probably this code will fail if it is faulty?" Musa labels a similar measurement as the fault exposure ratio, K, in his reliability formulae 6]. The empirical methods for estimating testability are distinct from Musa's techniques, however.
Our research has emphasized random testing, because of its attractive statistical properties. However, in full generality, software testability could be de ned for di erent types of testing (e.g. data ow testing, mutation testing, etc.). The IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology (1990) de nes testability as: \(1) the degree to which a system or component facilitates the establishment of test criteria and the performance of tests to determine whether those criteria have been met, and (2) the degree to which a requirement is stated in terms that permit establishment of test criteria and performance of tests to determine whether those criteria have been met."
Note here that in order to determine \the degree" you must have a \test criteria," and hence testability is simply a measure of how hard it is to satisfy a particular testing goal. Examples of testing goals include coverage and complete fault eradication. Testability requires an input distribution (commonly called a user pro le), but this requirement is not unique to testability; any statistical prediction of semantic behavior during software operation must include an assumption about the distributions of inputs during operation 3].
The reader should note that our de nition of software testability di ers from earlier de nitions of testability such as the IEEE de nition above. In the past, software testability has been used informally to discuss the ease with which some input selection criteria can be satis ed during testing. For example, if a tester desired full branch coverage during testing and found it di cult to select inputs that cover more than 50% of the branches, then the software would be classi ed as having poor testability. Our de nition di ers signi cantly, because we are not just trying to nd sets of inputs that satisfy coverage goals; we are quantifying the probability that a particular type of testing will cause failure. We focus our de nition of testability on the semantics of the software, how it will behave when it contains a fault. This is di erent from asking whether it facilitates coverage or is correct.
Software testability analysis is related to but distinct from both software testing and formal veri cation. Like software testing, testability analysis requires empirical work to create estimates. Unlike testing, testability analysis does not require an oracle. Thus testing and testability are complementary: testing can reveal faults (testability cannot) but testability can suggest locations where faults can hide from testing (something testing cannot do). The next section explores how testability analysis can be used in conjunction with testing and formal methods to give a clearer view of developing software.
Three Pieces of a Puzzle
Software testability, software testing, and formal veri cation are three pieces in a puzzle: the puzzle is whether the software that we have has a high enough true reliability. 1 If we are lucky enough to have a piece of software that (1) has undergone enormous amounts of successful testing, (2) has undergone formal veri cation, and (3) has high testability, then we have three pieces that t together to suggest that the puzzle is solved|high reliability is achieved. 2 Software testing, formal veri cation, and software testability all o er information about the quality of a piece of software. Each technique supplies a unique perspective, di erent evidence that the analyst must take into account. Even with these three \clues," the analyst is still making guesses; but having all three clues is better than having only two.
As a hypothetical example of how the three analyses can work together, consider a system that has 50 modules. Each of the modules is tested with 100 random tests, and (in their current versions) all modules pass these tests. In addition, the system passed 100 random tests. Ten of the modules, judged the most intricate and critical, are subjected to formal veri cation at various points in their development. Testability analysis reveals that 5 of the modules are highly insensitive to testing; i.e., testing is unlikely to nd faults in these modules if faults exist. Only one of these 5 modules has been formally veri ed. At this point, veri cation resources should concentrate on the 4 modules that have low testability and have not been formally veri ed; they are the most vulnerable to hidden faults.
As another example, consider a system built entirely of formally veri ed modules. Using a development approach inspired by cleanroom, the analysts wait until after system integration to do random system testing. During this testing, some faults are discovered and the code is repaired. Regression testing and new random tests reveal no more failures, but testability analysis identi es several places in the code where testing is highly unlikely to reveal faults. These pieces of code are subjected to further formal analysis and non-random tests are devised to exercise these sections more extensively. 1 Every system has a true (or xed) reliability which is generally unknown; hence we try to estimate that value through reliability modeling. 2 There is no widely accepted threshold for when software changes from being reliable to being \highly" reliable, however many use the 10 ?9 failures in a 10/hour ight as that threshold, knowing that testing alone can never demonstrate this degree of precision 2].
These examples illustrate that testability information cannot replace testing and formal veri cation; but they also suggest that testing and formal veri cation should not be relied upon exclusively either. Our view of software development and veri cation is inclusive. The most e ective software practitioners will take advantage of all available information in order to build and assess quality software. In the rest of this paper, we focus on software testability; but this discussion is always in the context of a technique that is complementary to testing and formal veri cation.
The remainder of this paper elaborates on three topics: software testability, designing for testability, and sensitivity analysis. In the next section we describe in more detail how testability relates to testing and formal analysis. Then we look at the mechanics of predicting testability at an early stage of development. We describe the concept of \information loss," a characteristic that can be predicted from an initial design description of the function to be programmed. The information loss characteristic provides insights that can be used to improve testability by basing software designfor-testability heuristics on it. We will describe \sensitivity analysis," a technique that quanti es behavioral information about the likelihood of faults hiding. Sensitivity analysis is dynamic and empirical, relying on repeated executions of the original and mutations of its source code and data states. Sensitivity analysis allows us to assess how much testability has been achieved by applying design-for-testability schemes. The nal section shows how the predictions of sensitivity analysis can be included in estimates of software reliability. If software faults were gold, then software testing would be gold mining. Software testability would be a geologist's survey done before mining takes place. It is not the geologist's job to dig for gold. Instead, the geologist establishes the likelihood that digging at a particular spot would be rewarding. A geologist might say, \This valley may or may not have gold, but if there is gold, it will be in the top 50 feet, and it will be all over this valley." At another location, the geologist might say, \Unless you nd gold in the rst 10 feet on this plateau, there is no gold. However, on the next plateau you will have to dig 100 feet before you can be sure there is no gold."
When software testing begins, such an initial survey has obvious advantages over testing blind. Testability suggests the testing intensity, whereas the geologist gives the digging depth. Testability provides the degree of di culty which will be incurred during testing of a particular location to detect a fault. If after testing to the degree speci ed by testability we observe no failures, then we can be reasonably sure that our program is correct 3 .
In a second analogy, we illustrate how fewer tests can yield an equivalent con dence in correctness if we are sure the software will not hide faults: imagine that you are writing a program for scanning black and white satellite photos, looking for evidence of a large barge. If you are sure that the barge will appear as a black rectangle, and that any barge will cover at least a 10 by 20 pixel area in an image, then the program can use techniques that could not be used if the barge size were not established beforehand. For example, assume that the original image has been subsampled so that each pixel in the new image is the average of a ve by ve square of pixels in the original image. This subsampled image could be scanned 25 times more quickly than the original; with the barge size guaranteed to be large enough, any barge would still be detectable in the lower resolution image. (The shape of a suspected barge could be determined by more detailed examination of the original image at higher resolution.) But if a barge might exist in the image as a smaller rectangle, then the low resolution image might hide the barge inside of one of its averaged pixels. The lower bound on barge size makes the lower resolution image su cient for locating barges. There is a direct relationship between the minimum barge size and the amount of speed-up that can be accomplished by subsampling.
Looking for a barge in the image is analogous to looking for faults in a program; instead of examining groups of pixels, we examine the output from test case executions. If a fault always will cause a larger proportion of inputs to fail during testing (this is analogous to a bigger barge), then fewer random tests will be required to reveal the fault (a coarser grid can be used to locate the barge). If we can guarantee that any fault in a program will cause the program to fail for a su ciently large proportion of tests, then we can reduce the number of tests necessary to be con dent that no faults exist. These two analogies indicate why testability information is a useful strategy complementary to testing. In the next section we discuss how to design testability into your system.
Designing for Testability: An Ounce of Prevention
Our goal is to assess software quality accurately enough to demonstrate whether or not is has high quality. If we use black-box testing alone to assess software, an intractable amount of testing is required to establish a very small probability of failure. (We will use the variable to represent the true probability of failure.) To assess a probability of failure that is less than 10 ?9 (i.e., 10 ?9 failures/test) with 99% con dence, it can be shown that approximately 4.6 billion successful executions (tests according to the input distribution) are needed. Even when a foolproof automated oracle is available, the practical problems of such testing are clear. Furthermore, if during random black-box testing the software does fail, then the software must be xed and random black-box testing must completely restart (i.e., we must ignore all previous successful executions and redo the testing). (Statistics have shown that as much as 30% of all new code contains new faults.) Clearly, we need to seek new methods that increase the e ectiveness of testing.
To reduce the number of required tests to a more tractable number, one of two techniques are available:
1. Select tests that have a greater ability to reveal faults. Research into test coverages and mutation adequate test sets seeks to nd more e ective individual tests and sets of tests.
2. Design software that has a greater ability to fail when faults do exist.
Designing programs to \fail big" when they have faults means that we must create programs that (1) are likely to have larger proportions of the code exercised for each input, (2) contain program constructs that are likely to cause the state of the program to become incorrect if the constructs are themselves incorrect, (3) propagate incorrect program states into software failure. Software design-for-testability addresses the issue of developing code that \fails-big"; this topic is the focus of this section.
A problem with code-based veri cation techniques is that they are applied late in the software life cycle. If the code that exists at this point is awed from incorrect or ine cient design decisions, then often little can be done during veri cation to undo the mistakes without enormous additional costs. This same problem exists for viewing testability only after the code is produced. But testability can be addressed much earlier in the life-cycle.
In integrated circuit design, testability has long been viewed as a required characteristic. Integrated circuit design engineers have a notion termed \observability," a notion that is closely related to software testability. Observability is the ability to view the value of a particular node that is embedded in a circuit. In software, when modules contain local variables, you lose the ability to see information in the local variables during functional testing. 4 In this sense, having local variables in software is analogous to lowering observability in circuits.
Discussing the observability of integrated circuits, 1] states that the principal obstacle in testing large-scale integrated circuits is the inaccessibility of the internal signals. One method used for increasing observability in integrated circuits design is to increase the pin count of a chip, allowing the extra pins to carry out additional internal signals that can be checked during testing. These output pins increase observability by increasing the range of potential bit strings from the chip.
We can apply a similar notion to increasing the pin count during software testing { increasing the amount of data state information that is checked during unit testing.
Information loss occurs when internal information computed by a program during execution is not communicated in the program's output. Information loss increases the potential for the cancellation of data state errors and therefore decreases software testability. We divide information loss into two broad classes: implicit information loss and explicit information loss.
Explicit information loss occurs when variables are not validated either during execution (by a self-test) or at execution termination as output. Explicit information loss can be observed using a technique such as static data ow analysis. Explicit information loss frequently occurs as a result of information hiding, although there are other factors that can contribute to it. Information hiding is a design philosophy that does not allow information to leave modules that could potentially be misused by other modules. Information hiding is widely accepted as good structured programming practice, which we advocate. However, hiding internal information is not good for testability at the system level, because the data in the local variables are then not available for revealing faults.
Implicit information loss occurs when two or more di erent incoming parameters are presented to a user-de ned function or a built-in operator and produce the same result. As an example of this at the operator level, consider the integer division computation a := a div 2; here, two di erent incoming values for a, 5 and 4, both result in a being assigned 2. Consider a user-de ned function that takes in two integer parameters and produces one boolean parameter; here, many di erent integer 2-tuples are possible, while only '0' or '1' result. Now consider the computation a := a + 1 in which there is no implicit information loss. In these two examples, the potential for implicit information loss occurring can be observed by statically analyzing the code. If a speci cation states that ten oating-point variables are input to an implementation, and 2 boolean variables contain the implementation's output, then we know that implicit information loss will occur in an implementation of this speci cation. If they are written with enough information concerning their domain and ranges, speci cations can be used to estimate the degree of the implicit information loss that will occur when the speci cation is implemented.
The Domain/Range Ratio
Clues suggesting some degree of the implicit information loss that may occur during execution may be visible from the program's speci cation; we use a speci cation metric termed the \do-main/range ratio" for suggesting a degree of implicit information loss. Recall that in the example we were also able to observe implicit information loss by code inspection. Therefore, a speci cation's domain/range ratio only suggests a portion of the implicit information loss that may occur; code inspection can give additional information concerning implicit information loss.
The domain/range ratio (DRR) of a speci cation is the ratio between the cardinality of the domain of the speci cation and the cardinality of the range of the speci cation. We denote a DRR by : , where is the cardinality of the domain, and is the cardinality of the range. As previously stated, this ratio will not always be discernible from a speci cation. However, when the DRR can be estimated, it gives important information about possible testability problems in the code required to implement the speci cation.
DRRs roughly predict a degree of implicit information loss. Generally as the DRR increases for a speci cation, the potential for implicit information loss occurring within the implementation increases. When is greater than , previous research has suggested that faults are more likely to remain undetected (if any exist) during testing than when = . When implicit information loss occurs, you run the risk that the lost information may have included evidence of incorrect data states. Since such evidence is not visible in the output, the probability of observing a failure during testing is somewhat reduced. The degree to which it is reduced depends on whether the incorrect information is isolated to bits in the data state that are not lost and are eventually released as output. As the probability of observing a failure decreases, the probability of undetected faults increases.
Another research report that presents a similar conclusion concerning the relationship between faults remaining undetected and the type of function containing the fault is 5]. While performing mutation testing experiments with boolean functions, Marick 5] noted that faults in boolean functions (where the cardinality of the range is 2) were more apt to be undetected than faults in other types of functions. Boolean functions typically have a great degree of implicit information loss. This result supports the idea that testability and the DRR are correlated. Additional evidence that correlation exists between implicit information loss and testability is currently being collected.
Correlating Implicit Information Loss and the DRR
Implicit information loss is common in many of the built-in operators of modern programming languages. Operators such as div, mod, and trunc have high DRRs. Table 1 contains a set of functions with generalized degrees of implicit information loss and DRRs. A function classi ed as having a yes for implicit information loss in Table 1 is more likely to receive an altered incoming parameter and still produce identical output as if the original incoming parameter were used; a function classi ed as having no implicit information loss in Table 1 is one that if given an altered incoming parameter would produce altered output. A yes in Table 1 suggests data state error cancellation would occur; a no suggests data state error cancellation would not occur. In Table 1 , all references to b assume it is a constant for simplicity. The in nities in the table are mathematical entities, but for any computer environment they will represent the cardinality of xed length number representations of nite size. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between implicit information loss and the DRR. In Figure  1 , we have 16 (a,b) input pairs that are presented to 2 functions: one performs real division, the other performs integer division. For the real division function there are 16 unique outputs, and for the integer division function there is one output. This example shows how the di erences in the DRRs of these two forms of division are correlated to di erent amounts of information loss.
Explicit Information Loss: Harder to Find Early
Explicit information loss is not predicted by a DRR. Recall that explicit information loss is observed through static code inspection, whereas the potential for implicit information loss can be predicted from functional descriptions or code inspection. Explicit information loss may also be observable from a design document depending on its level of detail. Explicit information loss is more dependent on how the software is designed, and less dependent on the speci cation's (input, output) pairs. 
Design Heuristics
We now present several strategies for reducing the detrimental e ects that information loss has on testability.
Speci cation Decomposition: Isolating Implicit Information Loss
A major advantage of using the DRR to guide development is that it is available very early in the life-cycle. Although the DRR of a speci cation is xed and cannot be modi ed without changing the speci cation itself, there are ways of decomposing a speci cation to reduce the potential of data state error cancellation occurring across modules. During speci cation decomposition, you have hands-on control of the DRR of each subfunction. With this, you gain an intuitive feeling (before a subfunction is implemented) for the degree of testing needed for a particular con dence that a module is propagating data state errors. The rule-of-thumb that guides this intuitive feeling is: \the greater the DRR, the more testing needed to overcome the potential for data state error cancellation." During a design, a speci cation can be decomposed in a manner such that the program's modules are designed to either have a high DRR or a low DRR. By isolating modules that are more likely to propagate incoming data state errors through them during program testing (low DRR), testing and analysis resources can be shifted during module testing to modules that are less likely to propagate incoming data state errors across them.
Minimizing Variable Reuse: Reducing Implicit Information Loss
One method for decreasing implicit information loss is to minimize the reuse of variables. For instance, as we have already seen, a computation such as a := sqr(a) destroys the original value of a, and although you can take the square root after this computation and retrieve the absolute value that a had, you have lost the sign. Minimizing variable reuse is one attempt to decrease the amount of implicit information loss.
Minimizing variable reuse requires either creating more complex expressions or declaring more variables. If the number of variables is increased, memory requirements are also increased during execution. If complex expressions are used, we reduce the testability when a single expression represents what were previously many intermediate values. Although some literature supports programming languages based on few or no variables, programs written in such languages will almost certainly su er from low testabilities. We advocate using more variables, and then making more variables available during testing.
Increasing Out-Parameters: Reducing Explicit Information Loss
Consider the analogy where modules are integrated circuits and local variables are internal signals in integrated circuits. This analogy allows us to see how explicit information loss caused by local variables parallels the notion of low observability in integrated circuits. Since explicit information loss suggests lower testabilities, we prefer, when possible, to lessen the amount of explicit information loss that occurs during testing. And if limiting the amount of explicit information loss is not possible, we at least have the bene t of knowing where the modules with greater data state error cancellation potential are before validation begins.
One approach to limiting the amount of explicit information loss is to insert write statements to print internal information. This information must then be checked for correctness during each test. A second approach is increasing the amount of output that these subspeci cations return by treating local variables as out-parameters during testing. A third approach inserts self-tests (or \assertions") that are executed to check internal information during computation. Our research has suggested that assertions are particularly useful for testability analysis; not only can assertions be used to assure that a particular variable is correct or in range at some point during execution, but a failed assertion also suggests the possibility that previous computations (on which the variable de nition depends) might be erroneous. In this approach, messages concerning incorrect internal computations are subsequently produced, so in terms of testability, the likelihood of fault hiding is reduced.
These three approaches both produce two important results:
1. The people formalizing the speci cation are forced to produce detailed information about the states of the internal computations. This should increase the likelihood that the code is written correctly, and it forces the code to test itself.
2. The dimensionality of the range of the intended function is increased, which may increase the cardinality of the range, thus reducing information loss.
These two approaches simulate the idea previously mentioned that is used in integrated circuits| increasing the observability of internal signals 1]. In advocating these approaches, we are not repudiating the practice of information hiding during design. However, when writing software such as safety-critical software, there is a competing imperative: to enhance testability. Information that is not available during testing encourages undetected faults, and increased output discourages undetected faults. Perhaps an answer is to pattern software testing more closely on hardware testing: we should specify special output variables (pins) that are speci ed and implemented speci cally and exclusively for testing.
A disadvantage to these approaches is that for the approaches to be bene cial, they all need additional speci ed information concerning the internal computations. Maybe the real message of this research is that until we make the e ort to better specify what must occur, even at the intermediate computation level, testabilities and our assessed reliabilities will remain low. The unfortunate conclusion of our design-for-testability research is that we must validate more internal information if we hope to increase software testability. To validate more internal information, we must have some way of checking this additional internal information. This requires that more information be described in the speci cation and requirements phase. If we are not willing to specify these details at some point, we cannot expect to substantially improve reliability assessments.
Sensitivity Analysis
The previous section described how we can improve software testability. But a question remains: \How can we measure the increase in testability?" This section brie y presents a model for quantifying software testability that is described in more detail in 10].
Sensitivity analysis is based on separating software failure into three phases: execution of a software fault, creation of an incorrect data state, and propagation of this incorrect data state to a discernible output. This three part model of software failure is referred to as PIE, for Propagation, Infection, and Execution. There is a separate algorithm for each part of the PIE model: (E)xecution Analyzer, (I)nfection Analyzer, and (P)ropagation Analyzer. 5 In the rest of this section we give a brief outline of the three phases of sensitivity analysis. For more details, see 10] . To simplify explanations, we will describe each phase separately, but in a production analysis system, processing for the phases would overlap. As with the analysis of random testing, the accuracy of the sensitivity analysis depends in part on a good estimate of the input distribution that will drive the software when it is in use.
Before a fault can cause a failure, it must be executed. In this paper we will concentrate on faults that can be isolated at a single location in a program. A location can be de ned as a single high level language statement, one machine code instruction, or some intermediate amount of computation. Our experiments thus far have de ned a location as a piece of source code that can change the data state (including input and output les and the program counter). Thus an assignment statement and an if statement de ne a location, and a statement read(a,b) de nes two locations. The probability of execution for each location is determined by repeated executions of the code with inputs selected at random from the input distribution. The execution analyzer estimates these execution probabilities.
If a location contains a fault, and if the location is executed, the data state of the execution may or may not be changed adversely by the fault. If the fault does change the data state into a data state that is incorrect for this input, we say the data state is infected. To estimate the probability of infection, the second phase of sensitivity analysis performs a series of syntactic mutations on each location. After each mutation, the program is re-executed with random inputs; each time the monitored location is executed, the data state is immediately compared with the data state of the original (unmutated) program at that same point in the execution. If the state di ers, infection has taken place. The infection analyzer estimates the infection probability.
The third phase of the analysis estimates propagation. Again the location in question is monitored during random tests. After the location is executed, the resulting data state is changed by assigning a random value to one data item using a predetermined distribution. (Research is ongoing as to the best distribution to use for this random selection.) After the data state is changed, the program continues executing until an output results. The output that results from the changed data state is compared to the output that would have resulted without the change. If the outputs di er, propagation has occurred and a propagation probability can be estimated. The propagation analyzer estimates these propagation probabilities.
Sensitivity analysis is a fault simulation/injection-based method that relies on the two assumptions which are admittedly awed: single fault and simple fault. The single fault assumption says that the program contains a single fault, not multiple faults distributed throughout the pro-gram. The simple fault assumption says that the fault exists in a single location, not distributed throughout the program. Without these assumptions, the combinatorics of simulating classes of distributed or multiple faults becomes intractable. Hence the fault classes that we simulate are arti cially restricted. Despite this theoretical weakness, in practice the empirical techniques have yielded impressive experimental results (see 10]).
Each phase of sensitivity analysis produces a probability estimate based on the number of trials divided by the number of events that occurred (either execution, infection, or propagation). For a random test to reveal a fault, execution, infection, and propagation must occur to result in a failure. Thus the product of the mean of these estimates yields an estimate of the probability of failure that would result if this location had a fault. If we instead take the minimum over all three estimates and then obtain a product, we have a bound on the minimum probability of failure that would result if this location had a fault.
Sensitivity analysis is a new, empirical technique; pilot experiments in the early 1990s were done using hand coded syntactic mutations and only semi-automated data state mutations. The complexity of the processing required for sensitivity analysis is quadratic in the number of code locations, and therefore requires considerable bookkeeping and execution time. Since sensitivity analysis does not require an oracle, it can be completely automated for programs of any size although processing time can be a practical limit for large programs analyzed in a single block. A fully automated and commercialized sensitivity analysis tool, PiSCES 1.2 has been built and has been applied to systems as large as 100K SLOC. The tool can operate on larger systems, but to our knowledge has not. The value of sensitivity analysis is generally two-fold: (1) determining how much system level testing is needed to gain a con dence that faults are not hiding, and (2) for identifying those regions of the code of extreme low testability, where additional unit testing or other V&V resources should be applied. Additional bene ts can be realized with slight modi cations to the senstivity analysis algorithms. For example, we have elsewhere described how to modify the algorithms to increase fault-tolerance and improve software safety assessment. These and other applications are outside of the scope of this paper.
In summary, we contend that the results of experiments in sensitivity analysis are su cient to motivate additional research and use with this technique; successful experiments have been shown in 10, 8] . We cannot guarantee that this new technique will make it possible to assess reliability to the precisions required for life-critical software. However, we do think it is premature to declare such an assessment impossible. The following sections argue that if software testability produces accurate predictions, then it will be possible to combine random black-box testing with sensitivity analysis to assess reliability more precisely than is possible with black-box testing alone. 6 The \Squeeze Play" Both random black-box testing and sensitivity analysis gather information about possible probability of failure estimates for a program. However, the two techniques generate information in distinct ways: random testing treats the program as a single monolithic black-box but sensitivity analysis examines the source code location by location; random testing requires an oracle to determine correctness but sensitivity analysis requires no oracle because it does not judge correctness; random testing includes analysis of the possibility of no faults but sensitivity analysis focuses on the assumption that one fault exists. Thus, the two techniques give di erent kinds of predictions about the probability of failure.
Although the true probability of failure of a particular program (conditioned on an input distribution) is a single xed value, this exact value is unknown to us. We therefore treat the probability of failure as a random variable . We then use black-box random testing to estimate a probability density function (pdf) for conditioned on an input distribution. We also predict a pdf for using sensitivity analysis; this prediction is conditioned on the same input distribution as the testing pdf, but the pdf predicted using sensitivity analysis is also conditioned on the assumption that the program contains exactly one fault, and that this fault is equally likely to be at any location in the program. 6 The assumption of this single, randomly located error is a variation on the competent programmer hypothesis. location , the height of the curve indicates the estimated probability that the true probability of failure of the program has value < . The curve in Figure 2 (A) is an example of an estimated pdf derived from random black-box testing; we assume that the testing has uncovered no failures.
As we test more and more, we expect those probabilities of failure near 0.0 to be more likely and those closer to 1.0 to be less likely. Of course after only one test that produces the correct output, Pr( = 1:0) = 0.0. Details about deriving an estimated pdf for given many random tests are
The curve in Figure 2 (B) is an example of an estimated pdf for that might be derived from sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis estimates at each location the probability of failure that would be induced in the program by a single fault at that location. This pdf is conditioned on the assumed input distribution, on the assumption that the program contains exactly one fault, and on the assumption that each location is equally likely to contain that fault.
We have marked interval estimates for each estimated pdf. If the interval marked between 0.0 and^ includes 90% of the area under the estimated pdf in Figure 2(A) , then according to 6 10] formalizes the method employed to nd a predicted probability of failure from sensitivity analysis. (B)^ is an prediction of the minimum probability of failure using sensitivity analysis. random testing the actual probability of failure is less than^ with a con dence of 90%. Similarly, if the interval in Figure 2 (B) includes 10% of the area under the estimated pdf, then according to sensitivity analysis, if there exists a fault, then it will imply a probability of failure that is greater than^ with con dence of 90%.
If there exists a fault and it induces a near-zero probability of failure, testing is unlikely to nd that error. Locations that have sensitivity estimates very close to zero are troubling in an ultra-reliable application. However, a \fault" that induces a probability of failure (pof) of exactly 0 is technically not a fault at all { no failures will be observed with such a fault. If there are no faults in a program, then the true probability of failure is 0 (i.e., = 0:0), and ultra-reliability (or \correctness") has been achieved. Figure 2 (A) suggests that if there is a fault, it is likely to induce a small probability of failure; Figure 2 (B) suggests that tiny impact faults (meaning those that cause the program to fail with probabilities that are less that^ ) are unlikely. We now attempt to quantify the meaning of the two estimated pdfs taken together. where C is probable correctness, is the true pof,^ is some approximation of , and 0 <^ 1. 7 1 ?C is the likelihood that >^ , meaning that we have been fooled into thinking that ^ , when really >^ . Let represent the impact caused to the true pof by the smallest fault in the program; then is the smallest possible non-zero pof for the program if all other independent faults were removed. If there are other faults, < . is assumed to be unknown to us. Let^ represent the prediction of from sensitivity analysis according to our code, the testing distribution, D, and the fault classes that sensitivity analysis simulated. Note that one of the following situations is true, but we cannot know which it is:^ > or ^ . After using T 0 test cases to nd^ , we have con dence C 0 :
is obtained by subtracting a small fudge factor to the numerical estimate of found via sensitivity analysis using T 0 test cases. Given that actual pofs in the interval (0,^ ) are unlikely, our con dence that = 0.0 is just: P r( = 0:0) 1 ? (1 ? C 0 ) + P r( <^ )]; (3) where Pr( <^ ) is the probability that we failed to correctly assess the minimum pof induced by any fault in our program from the fault classes that we simulated. 8 This probability is a function of the fault classes that were simulated and the sample size of test cases from D that were used during sensitivity analysis. Realize that there could be a fault in our program (from a fault class not simulated) that has a smaller impact on than the fault classes that we did consider.
To better explain equation 3, assume that we have tested T times and found no errors. Assume further that sensitivity analysis has selected^ as the smallest pof induced by any of the faults it simulated. We will use^ as a reference point for establishing a con dence in this software. Trivially, 1 = P r( = 0) + P r(0 < <^ ) + P r( ^ ) ?! P r( = 0) 1 ? P r(0 < <^ ) ? P r( ^ ) 7 Hamlet calls C a measure of probable correctness, but it would be called a con dence in correctness if the equations were cast in a traditional hypothesis test.
Thus we can estimate the probability that the program is correct by estimating Pr(0 < ^ ) by sensitivity analysis and by estimating Pr( >^ ) using Hamlet's probable correctness equation and T .
The goal of the \Squeeze Play" model is to push^ towards^ in Figure 2 when T is xed and con dence is high 4]. As^ approaches or exceeds^ we can be increasingly con dent that the software is correct. As an example of equation 3, suppose that we have a program with three independent faults, with impacts to of: 0.0001, 0.00001, and 0.000001. In this situation, = 0:000111, and = 0:000001. Suppose that^ = 0:000015. In this situation,^ > , but >^ . If C 0 is xed close to 1.0 (meaning that the T 0 we will try is large enough with respect to^ ), then the likelihood that the program will fail at least once in T tests is also close to 1.0, and hence we are unlikely to be able to apply equation 1 since a failure should occur. Now suppose that we remove the faults with pofs of 0.0001 and 0.00001 after observing one or more failures, and when we reperform sensitivity analysis on the modi ed program,^ is still 0:000015. 9 Again we will test this code T 0 times in order to x C 0 close to 1.0. Since <^ , Pr( <^ ) = 1:0 and Pr( = 0:0) = 0:0. Given that we cannot know the probability of a true fault causing a lower impact to the actual failure probability than^ (without knowing where all of the faults are), the best that we can say about a con dence in absolute correctness (based on T successful tests and ) is that we have con dence C 00 that the true probability of failure is 0.0 where: 
In this section we have shown one method for combining testability analysis with testing results to sharpen an estimate of the true pof. This use of testability measurement here is essentially a clean-up operation, a method of assessing whether or not software has achieved a desired level of reliability. We believe that testability assessment is more useful earlier in the development of software. This idea is dramatized in Table 2 which gives you a feeling for how expensive testing to di erent levels of con dence is given di erent degrees of testability.
Conclusions
Our research suggests that software testability clari es a characteristic of programs that has been largely ignored. We think that testability o ers signi cant insights that are useful during design, testing, and reliability assessment. In conjunction with existing testing and formal veri cation methods, testability holds promise for quantitative improvement in statistically veri ed software quality. We are particularly interested in designing software to increase its testability. Ideally, a design process begins with a (functional description, input distribution) pair that speci es the intended software. It may be that a theoretical upper bound exists on the testability that can be achieved for a given (functional description, input distribution) pair. If we can change the functional description to include more internal information, we should be able to increase that upper bound. Although the existence of an upper bound on testability is mentioned solely as conjecture, our research using sensitivity analysis and studying software's tendency to not reveal faults during testing suggests that such exists. We challenge software testing researchers to consider this conjecture.
A given piece of software will or will not hide a given fault from testing. We have found that it is possible to examine this code characteristic without knowing if a particular fault exists in that software, and without reference to correctness. Since it does not rely on correctness, this characteristic, software testability, gives a new perspective on code development. We have brie y described one dynamic technique, software sensitivity analysis, for predicting software testability. Sensitivity analysis has yielded promising results in several experiments 10]; research and practical application of this technique continues. Perhaps other more e ective or more e cient testability measurement techniques will be discovered in the future, but whatever techniques are employed to measure testability, we are convinced that this inherent software characteristic will become an important factor to consider during software development and assessment.
